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JULY 1948

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the productiveness and the resources of human quality

THIS IS THAT WHICH WILL INDEED DIGNIFY AND EXALT KNOWLEDGE, IF CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION MAY BE MORE NEARLY AND STRAITLY CONJOINED AND UNITED TOGETHER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN: A CONJUNCTION LIKE UNTO THAT OF THE TWO HIGHEST PLANETS, SATURN THE PLANET OF REST AND CONTEMPLATION, AND JUPITER, THE PLANET OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACTION. —BACON

What the plain view perceives is neither obvious nor obscure

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COMMENTARY

WESTERN UNION. The Congress at the Hague might have been a fiasco. Experienced political heads had no great hopes of it. The impressiveness of the event was due less to the mechanics of good conference engineering than to the demonstration of an unexpectedly powerful popular will to union which the Conference had focused. There is a tide running which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. What is the inspiration of this movement? It is safe to say that the motives, hopes, and convictions which move this way are very mixed, very muddled, and pretty incongruous. Those objects which have been formulated and widely discussed, like the defence of western values, resistance to communism, economic needs, world peace, may be regarded as the bonds of union.

If the concept of western values is the ideological basis of the Union, its majesty will have borrowed the Emperor's new clothes, which everyone will profess to admire and nobody will be able to see. For what are these western values, visible or invisible? To many it is clear that Christianity, liberal humanism, and political democracy must be numbered amongst them. Nobody talks much in this connexion of atheism, materialism, socialism and other such children of the good European mother. Communism itself was nursed in the same bosom. The chastened beneficent Christianity of our time is a peculiarly modern and anglo-saxon institution. Political democracy is also a late discovery under the impact of revolution; it is not the same thing as the love of liberty and hatred of oppression, which is as old as human nature and has long been compatible with subjection and submission. Montesquieu is careful to distinguish between the two, and careful to point out that democracies are not always free states, for political liberty exists only under moderate governments, and the establishment of moderate government is a political masterpiece, the rarest thing in the world. Even to-day our confidence in political democracy, if it is wise, is empirical, provisional. Western values are held to be traditional values, but the more they are looked for the more certain it becomes that they are aims and hopes rather than achievements. *The Times* and *The Times Literary Supplement* in one form and another have returned to the question week after week, and inconclusively. In this connexion, however, *The New York Times* is content to say and to reiterate: "What we in this country mean by democracy may be found in the Bill of Rights and the Gettysburg address."

All this does not worry those who recognize the primacy of vital facts. If Europeans have the will to live, and give effect to it in a bid for political union, there is small purpose in looking for

reasons which will induce them to do so. If it is necessary to provide the reasons first, the case is politically hopeless. Assuming, however, that there is good evidence of a genuine, powerful European will to union, what explanation can be offered? Marxists fail to recognize that post-war Europe is a post-Marxist world. To think and behave as if it were not is fanaticism or simplicity, unless indeed it is a cloak deliberately assumed to hide a naked lust for power; which would make of communism a spoils-system indistinguishable from fascism. The will to rule, historically speaking, is sometimes creative, sometimes diabolic. To suppose that it is always and necessarily the one or the other is a very serious error. Marx claimed for the proletariat in the 19th century the historic right to rule because they alone were competent to solve the economic problems of modern industrial society; the bourgeoisie so long as they ruled would rule in their own interests, and since it was not in their interests to produce plenty for all (the potential plenty which their capitalist system had created), they had become historically unfit to rule and were destined to be superseded by the proletariat who alone were capable of realizing the universal distribution of plenty. Explicitly, his argument follows the analogy of the creative bourgeois revolution, which in order to give effect to the new possibilities of industrial production had to take the reality of power from the greedy but failing and incompetent hands of the feudal aristocracy. Scientific socialism, like classical economics, applies perfectly to the simplified world of analysis. The fault is to mistake the world of politics for the ideal world of analysis. The influences which made Marxist thought and action, and were immensely reinforced by them, have already carried through the revolution in places where it has not been deliberately consummated. The situation in many countries of Western Europe has been transformed: the will and the technical competence to produce and to distribute plenty is not bound up directly with the rule of the proletariat. The conflict of interests has not been eliminated, but it is not everywhere dominant and decisive in the present situation. That is all. It is all-important. There is enough open-eyed political maturity in all classes and parties in these countries to stand up to fanatics and gangsters whose will to rule is diabolic, that is, barren of any creative historic mission. Marxist imperialism has passed its creative phase and lost its moral justification, that is the profounder meaning of this European stirring for union: there is something else on the way which claims to be able to deliver the goods. It is the future, not the traditional past, that stirs in this movement.

This much-tried generation has learned something from its crowded years of history. The Europe which is struggling to

survive the last war is not the same Europe which we watched decaying under our eyes between the wars. When that has been abundantly proved, perhaps there will be peace.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. The debates on the Death Penalty were characteristic of the moral confusion of our time. Only stupidity and the blindest prejudice could mistake the division of opinion for the difference between progress and reaction. One is tempted to say that all the speeches and all the letters to the Press were plausible, inconclusive, and unconvincing. Was there anybody old-fashioned, primitive (and philosophical) enough to demand retributive punishment for deliberate murder? Perhaps the much-abused Bishops came nearest to it. Yet if this debate does not begin with the common assumption that the moral forfeit for deliberate murder is the murderer's life, the whole discussion is frivolous. What is the moral ground for abolition? The moral case was not argued; it was taken for granted by both sides that it is overwhelming. The question was argued on the ground of whether or not it is expedient at this time to risk abolition. Those who wanted abolition argued that there was no evidence of deterrence; and that was held to be conclusive, a refutation of the argument from expediency. Only Lord Templewood used the argument from expediency to support abolition, saying in effect that abolition would be an arresting gesture of respect for human life, the most expedient of all actions in a world given over to murder; an argument which has the merit of being more originally Christian that the prevailing Christian sentiment.

Why should it be assumed as too obvious for argument that reformation and deterrence are the only legitimate principles of punishment in a civilized community? Retribution and mercy are inseparable twins, not without influence upon reformation. Certainly, as one noble lord remarked, you cannot reform the criminal you have executed, but the fact that criminals are executed, and that it is recognized that they ought to be, is a factor in the reformation of criminals who for good reasons are not executed. To say that this is a monstrous way of securing reformation, clean contrary to modern insight and modern methods, is to miss the point, for death is due to deliberate murderers. To hold that it is not due and not to hold that it is due, are views which sensibly affect conscience. To waive the death penalty absolutely, and on principle, is tantamount to admitting that in no case is a murderer really morally responsible for his act, or that in no case can it be fully established that he actually committed the murder, or if he can safely be held to have committed it, that he did so deliberately and with fully responsible purpose; or that in any case society has

no right nor duty to punish its members but only to protect them. Such arguments are too sophisticated or too timid. The principles of deterrence and reformation are in the air, arbitrary and without moral seriousness, unless they derive from the principle of retribution, the principle, in the case of murder, that one who plans and secures the death of another for personal advantage has lost, and should universally be recognized to have lost, his own title to live.

In a memorandum *The Purpose of Imprisonment,* prepared for the Howard League by George Benson, M.P., and Cicely Craven and printed in the current issue of *The Howard Journal,* the authors say: "We attempt to approach these questions objectively, accepting as axiomatic nothing more than the right of the community to impose the minimum sanctions necessary for its protection. For anything else we regard empirical justification as necessary . . . We suggest . . . that retributive punishment can have no place in a rational penal code". Would the abolition of the death penalty, then, if it were not a deterrent, have no discernible consequences? One consequence that would seem to be involved is the view that the murderer, however guilty, can "make good" and that it is the business of society to help him to do so. Under a Christian dispensation, he can. In the humanist view, can he? It is a serious question. The less obvious consequences of abolition have not been carefully weighed.

Although there may be no good reason why the death sentence should not be passed as a matter of course on everyone convicted of deliberate murder, there are many good reasons for tempering the treatment of the sentenced criminal in many, perhaps in most, cases; and it is reasonable that public opinion should encourage the Home Secretary to make execution exceptional. Above all, there is every reason for the abolition of the hangsman, and the infliction of the penalty, if it is to be inflicted, by the least gruesome and the least painful method. But the formula of abolition is far too simple for the facts of the case, moral, psychological, and social.

TALK OF THE DEVIL. The weekly competition in *The New Statesman* recently set its readers to write obituary notices on the death of Satan. It was good fun, but does it really bear thinking about? The obituaries with discreet admiration summed up a magnificently all-too-human career. But what would really be the reflections of right thinking persons upon an event so momentous? If (*per impossibile*) God died, that on theistic assumptions would be the end of all things: there would be no readers of obituaries. His interesting adversary is not credited with such profound importance to us all. It may even be said by the thoughtless that of course he died out long ago, that no intelligent Christian

nowadays dreams of thinking that he really exists, or that he ever did seriously exist. It is only logical to point out that the death of an immortal spirit is followed by resurrection. Surely enough in the minds of some Christians Satan has appeared again, startling them with the reflection that if they have so far forgotten him as to lapse into disbelief in his very existence, by what logic do they still believe in God: it seems a bit arbitrary, to personify good and not to personify evil. All things are possible of course to the human mind, and it may well be not even difficult to find good reasons for getting rid of Satan and keeping God. Indeed, there are obviously good reasons for doing it if good reasons can do it. It is not so obvious that good reasons can.

In the imperial days of Christendom Satan had an effective part in the government. Quite apart from his considerable office as gaoler and ruler of the damned, an office which no government has yet been able to dispense with, his perpetual opposition and the ascription to him of all evil and all blame enabled the Christian subject to be worshipful, to discharge his resentment, and to gratify his rebellious desires. When Satan passed away (if he has passed away) government was not nearly so easy, and that was only to be expected. John Stuart Mill indignantly demanded that God should either take full responsibility for his miscreation and accept execration and execution at the hands of his creatures, or else abdicate his omnipotence and accept the aid of loving and devoted representatives of his people in the conduct of his noble and adventurous enterprise. Unfortunately, even in the 19th century, God was not constitutionally fitted to be a limited monarch and his personal creation was not amenable to representative government; so that the scheme was a failure. It looked like the beginning of the end. The totalitarian throne is difficult to occupy if the Enemy is taken away: if he does not exist he has to be invented. That is a commonplace of politics. Even to-day God rules most definitely where Satan is also acknowledged. If theologians get rid of the Evil One (whose existence admittedly has certain inconveniences), there are likely to be repercussions, which as good civil servants they fully recognize. Changing the metaphor, they are too experienced in the art of popular fiction to bring the villain to the fate he deserves before he is played out. Only tiros could afford to earn the *New Statesman's* guineas.

THE PROFIT MOTIVE

[*This article is the sixth of a series on the profit motive in trade and industry to-day. The last appeared in the January issue.*]

THE profit motive requires analysis under the two headings of incentive and ethics. These two aspects must not be rigidly separated; the guiding considerations are interlocked at various points. But there is a broad distinction between the question of the efficiency of profit as a method of actuating useful economic service, and that of the moral judgement we may pass upon a system by which work is done for a seemingly selfish purpose, and upon the resulting distribution of income among the members of the society.

In the economic analysis of profit, two aspects have to be distinguished. On the one hand, profit is a reward for efficient work, a form of payment by result. The industrious and able man who manages his business well may receive a high profit, while the idle, careless or foolish manager gets a smaller profit, or may make a loss. On the other hand, profit may undoubtedly include a gambling element. This arises from the uncertainty of the future. The greatest wisdom cannot penetrate the mysteries of what is to come; the needs and tastes of consumers may change, technology may bring surprises rendering equipment obsolete, the actions of competitors at home and abroad are unpredictable. It is a mistake to suppose that these uncertainties could to any great extent be removed by a system of central planning. They arise out of the essential characteristics of man and of progress. Man is to some extent a restless being, shifting his desires to new objectives. Progress essentially involves surprise; if we knew in advance what changes in our procedures, whether of production or consumption, the inventions of science would require, they would not be inventions; and we could jump straight into the benefits thereof at once. If a communist society appeared to eradicate the uncertainties of business, that would be an optical illusion. It would merely shift the incidence of them on to the consumer or the tax payer, requiring the former to buy out of date articles because they had been planned, or requiring the latter to finance the losses involved in the writing off of equipment rendered obsolete. The special feature of free enterprise or capitalism is that the bearing of the risks inherent in the human situation is concentrated upon a body of volunteers who offer to carry them. This specialisation allows them to make profit, sometimes very large profit, but it also involves them in loss, which is thereby taken off the shoulders of the general public. The system implies, of course, that there is a class of people with sufficient means to carry these risks. The question may be raised whether that in itself should be considered

an evil, and, if so, whether it is counterbalanced by the fact that the carrying of risk is taken off the shoulders of the remainder of society.

Since the future is inherently uncertain, no one, however able, can be sure that his present investments will yield their expected return. What is essentially inscrutable cannot be analysed by the most powerful brain. In a great number of cases, however, the able man may get a closer approximation to the truth than the dullard. If one took the accounts of a hundred entrepreneurs engaged in a similar kind of business in a certain epoch and a certain country, one would expect to find that in gross the fifty abler members of the group had made a larger total profit than the fifty less skilful. But there would be no assurance that any particular entrepeneur would make more money than one less skilful. The ablest of all might have backed the wrong horse, and the stupidest have backed the winner. This is the inevitable consequence of a genuine uncertainty, which cannot be resolved by calculation, as to how things will turn out.

The fact that on the whole industry, care and skill tend to be rewarded by a better remuneration is without question a stimulus to effort. The profit taker constantly has in mind that his application will bring him a reward. There is all the difference in the world between a man who goes to his office, sorts through his papers, reaches the required decisions on the basis of conscientious scrutiny, and, against a background of carefree security, leaves his office at the appointed hour, and the man who knows that by that little bit of extra application, by pondering and weighing, by deploying all his resources of energy and imagination, by working beyond the normal hours, by unremitting attention to detail, he will be able to become or remain prosperous or save himself and his family from distress. In the lower ranks of work, the difference in quality between day work and piece work is a commonplace; so much so, that trade union leaders insist, when there is a change over in the factory from the former to the latter, that the basic minimum rate to be guaranteed under the piece work system shall be equivalent to a time and a quarter, or whatever the fraction may be, of the old day work rate. It is thereby implied as axiomatic that men subject to payment by result will work at greater tempo. Payment of business enterprise by profit is a form of payment by result.

It is important to stress in this connection that in most cases; the profit for the sake of which effort and loving care are lavished is not merely the profit to accrue on the current year's accounts. The whole future profit over a number of years is part of the prospect. It is a question of building up on secure foundations a

business that will in due course yield expanding profit. A man thinks of his whole future, and indeed of his children. It is the great game of establishing the business firmly and expanding it over a long term of years. The long term yield is always in his mind.

There is no doubt that taxation at existing rates has already to a large extent undermined the profit incentive. A man may still succeed in drawing a sufficient livelihood from his business. But it is now physically impossible for him to save sufficient sums to build up a great business from small beginnings within a reasonable term of years—at least not without a rigid and prolonged self-denial, which may itself prove unacceptable or, at the best, diminish the attractiveness of being someone who works for profit. To put it bluntly, an enterprising young man ought to be able to envisage the possibility of "making a fortune." Not many may do this. But the self-confidence and buoyancy of youth give hope, and, if some do and can, each may have belief in his own powers. It was precisely for this purpose that nature has arranged the disagreeable system by which a finite term for human life is set, and one generation dies off in order to give place to another, which will face its tasks with renewed hope. But if the young man knows that, however skilful and however lucky he is, the economic system in which he lives makes it impossible for him to win through and raise himself to a far better level than he could ever achieve on a purely salaried basis, he may not consider it worth while to carry the risk of working for profit. Considering the comparatively small yield to the Exchequer of the high rates of Surtax, we may well believe that society as a whole and thereby the non-Surtax payers are losing by the high rates now in force.

Important also in this connection is the risk of loss, which is inseparable from the profit system. A man may redouble his efforts for the sake of a golden prospect. He may also do so to avert disaster. He has his own property at stake in the venture. He might have invested it in safe gilt-edged securities. Having ventured, it is incumbent upon him to see that he makes good. It would be a disaster if by careless inattention he lost those sums which he had inherited or acquired by previous saving. Indeed, it might well be a good plan, in order to secure right thinking about this matter, to rechristen the profit motive as "the loss motive." For the loss motive is at least as important in its incentive effect as the profit motive. It is one which is highly relevant at the present juncture. Although both motives are conducive to careful, well-considered management, one may suppose that the loss motive is psychologically more relevant when the question is that of the critical scrutiny of a proposed outlay. Under the system of private

enterprise, ill-considered expenditure will not be recouped. Expenditure is always therefore regarded with a critical, if not a jaundiced, eye. The necessary calculations have to be made. But there is usually more in it than this, for in most cases the issue cannot be accurately determined by calculations. Impalpable uncertainties usually come into the picture. A man must not only calculate, he must judge. In one part of human activity, where we have the happy benefit of the progress of physics and chemistry, a choice between two methods may be amenable to perfectly accurate mathematical calculations, and there may be no more to be said about it; but where the human element still comes in, as it must in the greater part of industrial and commercial decisions, there is still something more to be decided after the process of calculation has been completed. This does not mean that the matter is entirely one of chance. Man as a thinking being is older than mathematical science. He has inscrutable thought processes by which he can arrive at a nearer approximation to the truth than he would if he chose at random; a "hunch" is not the same as random choice. But a man's latent powers of judgement, powers that have served him from the very dawn of civilisation to better his lot, are not always evoked. He needs a danger signal to quicken his attention and bring his faculties to the alert. The civil servant surveys the calculations and sits back and says, "That looks all right." If subsequently questioned by his superior, he will be able to produce the calculations. "They look all right." The superior can produce them in reply to a Parliamentary question. All this is particularly relevant to-day because of the huge outlay now being undertaken, directly by, or at the suggestion of, Government departments. On paper they may be justifiable. But would they in all cases be authorised if the man responsible for each decision knew that, if the work projected was not remunerative, he would have signed away a decent living in his old age and his children's patrimony?

It is no doubt true in certain cases that unremunerative outlay is justifiable. It is important that this should be recognised, and that authority for incurring it should be given to the appropriate bodies. But our economic system is being changed in such a way that even where the full benefits of a given outlay can be measured in money, the yield is no longer related to the outlay by the ordinary methods of accountancy. This is a bad trend. It is most important that wherever it is possible to express the benefits in monetary terms and relate them to expenditure, this should be done. Otherwise our resources will be dissipated.

The word has gone out in certain quarters that, whatever we may do about the small fry of business activities, responsibility for

investment in the basic industries should lie with the State. But it is precisely in these basic industries that big outlay has to be undertaken, and that big losses may occur if the outlay is ill-considered. Is it really wise to divorce these great outlays from the "loss incentive?" Is it not probable that we are here and now indulging in vast expenditures which would never have been undertaken if the men who authorised them had to incur the loss in their own pockets? I think so.

It is sometimes argued that the question of the profit incentive is not very relevant to the transfer of certain industries from private enterprise to the State on the ground that much enterprise is in the hands of large joint stock companies in which the relevant decisions are not made by profit takers at all. It might be said that in the analysis of profit which I gave at the outset the remuneration for ability is now catered for in the payment of salaries to managers, while the owners of the business, in the persons of the ordinary shareholders, alone obtain the "profit," and do so as a premium against the risk they bear. The amount of premium which they shall have is determined by the wisdom of the Stock Exchange in its valuation of the assets which are bought and sold there. No doubt this argument has an element of truth, but it is greatly overstated. The top management of great concerns has a direct pecuniary interest in their profit or loss. It is obvious that if a business expands and prospers, the chief appointments in it will be upgraded and better paid. If it runs into a period of loss, those at the head will know that they cannot expect a rise of salary, or may have to accept reductions as part of a necessary plan of all-round economy. An experienced manager will no doubt be able to get other employment if his business comes to an end. But he must expect to be taken on in his new position on less favourable terms. In a certain sense, a man may be deemed to "invest" his own abilities and prospects in a business to which he remains attached in a responsible capacity for a number of years, and, like those who invest their money in it, he stands to make a profit or loss according to the prosperity of the firm. This induces a responsible attitude of mind in the highest ranks. Nor is this attitude necessarily confined to them. It permeates downwards. Lower ranks also have to look on decisions for which they are responsible in a business-like way, that is, with careful regard to their ultimate effect upon the profit and loss account.

Careful avoidance of loss is an important element; so too is the other aspect, adventure, branching out, taking new kinds of risk. The mentality of the civil service is not well-adapted to this function. The future is inscrutable, and successful adventure depends upon the correct "hunch." Civil servants are not trained

to proceed by "hunches." They prefer written instructions, precise calculations and arguments which can be presented as one hundred per cent. valid in the event of enquiry. Business decisions can seldom be supported by arguments of this character. Not that this cautious mentality is a sufficient safeguard against large expenditure, for large expenditure, although inherently unwise, may proceed from ministerial instructions based on copy-book notions. The fact is that neither on the side of adventure nor on that of caution can the relevant imponderable considerations which govern business be brought to bear in an administration which has to justify itself according to a set of rules. Business wisdom, both on the positive and negative side, is not amenable to rules. Productive or trading activity which has to be governed by rules will err gravely both on the side of commission and of omission.

It might be urged that the Civil Service should transform itself, and take on the business spirit. But is this possible, human nature being what it is? Can the right mental attitude be evoked save by the profit and loss incentive? And is it desirable that the Civil Service should be so transformed? This question is linked up with the difference between democratic and totalitarian or autocratic government. Democratic government is in essence responsible government. The responsibility is to Parliament. The executive must not act in an arbitrary way, but must show that what is decided has the authority of legislation to support it. It is most important, therefore, that those responsible for administration in a democracy should be deeply imbued with a sense of responsibility and accountability. They are there to administer the law. They must be able to show chapter and verse, the statute, the instruction that emanated from the statute and the connection between the two. We do not want them to have "hunches" that an alternative method of arranging our affairs would be more beneficial than those laid down by law. The more "civil service minded" our civil servants are, the better will the laws be administered and the more securely will freedom be maintained.

The autocratic government proceeds differently. In all its various activities, it follows its own lights as to what is good for the people. It has its "hunches" and acts upon them. Its civil service must endeavour to indoctrinate itself with the general point of view of its masters and act in their spirit. Although this is far from the business point of view, it is not so far from it as the mentality of the civil service which is administering statutes strictly in accordance with their letter and intention. The tasks of a democratic civil service naturally lend themselves to administration by the salaried official. Any attempt to "de-nature" our civil service would tend to undermine the democratic character of our government.

It remains to examine the ethical aspect of the profit motive. This may be considered from the point of view of the motive itself and from that of the consequent distribution of income in the society.

Extreme idealists would wish all work to be for its own sake or for that of service to our neighbours. The recognition of work for profit is deemed to give official sanction to the selfish element in human nature. None-the-less, it is impossible to exorcise this selfish element. If it does not find vent in earning a livelihood, it may run into other more harmful channels, such as the quest for power. Nor is it possible to endow all men with the willingness to exert themselves to the uttermost in a purely unselfish cause throughout the livelong day, year in year out. A wiser course is to harness those activities which in fact are for the good of society to self-interest, if possible. Having regard to the characteristics of ordinary people, the best plan is surely to induce them to do public service by rewards that will satisfy their self-interest. This was the philosophy of Adam Smith, and nothing better has been found of a workable character. Some economists may have thought of the matter a little too narrowly. They have suggested that a man runs his business only in order to advance himself, and that only incidentally, as a by-product so to speak, so far as his own motives are concerned, do his efforts advance the well-being of the community. But in a well-arranged system, a man may be quite conscious, and be inspirited by the consciousness, that in running a business well he is doing a good service. He sees his strenuous efforts to enhance efficiency and reduce cost not only as likely to bring him a return, but also as providing the community with an excellent product. He may take pride in his wares, in the smooth-running of activity in his factories, and in the good conditions he is able to provide for his employees. What is needed is that the possibility of discord between his self-interest and the general good should be minimised. In this connection the guarantee of decent conditions by statute or collective bargaining is to be welcomed. These provide a set of rules of the game within which competition has to operate. It is undesirable that a man should advance his gain by paying less than his competitors to the operatives. Again monopolistic tendencies should be arrested. This is required not only in order to keep the profit motive pure, but also in the general interest. It is arguable that British entrepreneurs have tended in the recent period to have their attention diverted from efficient production, to pre-occupation with the negotiation of price agreements with their competitors. More recently, excessive taxation has riveted their attention on the task of how to mitigate its incidence, a subtle matter upon which vast labour may be expended.

No one can feel that he is benefiting the community by such an activity, and yet he is driven by self-interest to it. Here indeed is a discord.

The principle of paying for service rendered is by no means confined to the profit sector, but includes wages and salaries. Critics of the profit motive are not justified in holding that it is materialistic, unless they are prepared to sweep away the whole system of wages and rely exclusively on voluntary work, according to the pure principles of anarchism. Profit differs from wages in being to a much greater extent a "payment by result." There is also, of course, the gambling element which I must reserve for the end. To work for profit certainly cannot be regarded as involving a more materialistic point of view than to work for wages.

And so we come to the question of the distribution of income resulting from the profit system. The consequential distribution does not have to be taken as something absolutely fixed and given, but can be modified by a system of progressive taxation. It is true, however, as noticed above, that taxation if carried to excess may undermine the profit incentive and deprive society of its benefits.

What, according to moral principle, is the correct distribution of income? It is to be emphasised that there is some diversity of opinion and no clear principle. Nor is there any clearly recognised system of moral law, endorsed by any respectable body of moralists, which excludes the idea that the distribution of income may to some extent be governed by expediency. We are not debarred from modifying the distribution which might be regarded as best in itself, if such modification can be shown to promote higher production.

There is a variety of principle. Some have held that the national product should be equally divided. This is supposed to flow from some principle of justice. Justice is deemed to imply equality. In a certain sense, indeed, it does; all human beings should have equal treatment under the law. The idea, however, of absolutely equal treatment in all respects may easily be reduced to absurdity; it would neglect diversity of need. The problem is just how far the idea of equality should be extended. How can this be decided *a priori*?

A rival principle of distribution is one that may be derived from the "utilitarian" philosophy, which recommends promotion of the greatest happiness. This would not entail an equal distribution. Persons suffering from disabilities might require additional assignments to relieve them from suffering. This is not the only modification. People differ in their powers of enjoyment. Persons of imagination and susceptibility, who are capable of appreciating to the utmost extent the full flavour of every pleasure and every

experience, should have more goods assigned to them than those who take what comes as a matter of course and without imaginative appreciation. If one could argue—but this would be begging many questions—that the abler and more enterprising members of society are also the most imaginative and appreciative, this utilitarian principle would accord fairly well with the profit principle, subject, however, to a generous allocation of goods to those with disabilities. It has been claimed that the greatest happiness principle is the only one that can be justified by reason. This has also been denied.

There is quite a different principle which has strong support from common sense, but which is none-the-less suspect on higher grounds, that people should receive out of the national product a reward that is commensurate with their contribution to it. Those who produce much should have much; those who produce little should have little. This is the principle of rewards and punishment; those who do good service should be rewarded, those who fail to do so should suffer. This would chime in very nicely with the profit system—not precisely, however, because it would not recognise the speculative element in profit.

Perhaps one may class under a fourth heading the ideas of those who would base themselves principally on the emotions of pity and loving-kindness. Rejecting the abstractions of the first three principles already reviewed, they would wish to give as much as possible to mitigate hardship and distress. This accords fairly well with the utilitarian principle of greatest happiness, which takes into account the reduction of pain of all kinds as a prior claim.

If we rule out the principle of exactly equal partition, and if we suppose that provision is made, as proposed by Lord Beveridge, to cover all cases where a man is unable to earn his livelihood and satisfy his basic needs, through no fault of his own, the institution of profit does not seem to jar badly with the principles set out, although it does not conform precisely to any of them.

If we allow that each of these principles may be modified by the principle of expediency, may be modified, that is, in order to secure that the sum of goods available for distribution shall be as big as possible, then there is a strong case, not disallowed by any moral principle, for profit. The recent prejudice against it is something of a mystery.

Finally we must revert to the speculative element in profit. The system enables certain persons, because they have guessed correctly about incalculable future trends, to gain more than persons of precisely equal (or greater) assiduity and ability. A good man may suffer heavy losses through no fault of his own. Is this an intolerable state of affairs? It must be remembered that no one

is obliged to take those risks which entail profit or loss. A man may invest his savings in gilt-edged securities and engage himself in a salaried position. Profit takers are volunteers. We are therefore exempt from the necessity of stirring the social conscience to sorrow on account of their losses. Must the social conscience view their gains with reprobation? I do not think so.

In fact, I believe that if we carry this analysis on to a subtler plane, the opposite will appear to be true. Let us compare a society in which profit is possible, with one in which all basic needs, for which men through no fault of their own could not provide, were satisfied according to the full Beveridge principle, and in which, for the rest, reward was precisely commensurate with the value of service rendered. This latter would seem to be a society nicely ordered according to the copy-book; the meritorious would have much; the unmeritorious would not be left to rot; they would have basic needs provided, but they would have less than the meritorious, in proportion to their demerit. All very nice, but is it the kind of society we want? It is necessary to look at the picture as a whole. Would a society so arranged, according to the copy-book, really fulfil our highest ideal better than one in which there was some element of good and bad fortune? Would it not be a little dull? And worse—would it not be very considerably priggish? And worse—would it not be one in which some of the spice of life was removed? It is a habit in these days to advance severe criticism of the world into which we have been born. The work that was done in those momentous six days is judged, after all, not to have been so very good. It certainly seems on the surface to have some blemishes. One striking feature of this world is that everything is not precisely predictable, and everything does not proceed as in a school-room, with marks precisely awarded according to the number of mistakes made in the exercise. The element of good and bad fortune may seem on the surface to violate justice. But is it not justified—always provided that the extremes of distress are remedied when possible—by the far greater interest which is given to the adventure of life by this very element of fortune? Would not everyone feel that the inheritance into which they were born was less interesting, if everything in their life was to proceed according to mechanical rules until the last day? Must games of chance also be eradicated, as violating the principles of justice?

Furthermore, the precisely ordered society, in which the status of each person depended on his proved ability, would be distinctly hard on those insufficiently endowed. The presence of good and bad fortune that are dependent on chance gives an alibi to those who are less richly gifted by nature. They can always imagine that their lack of success is due to misfortune, and thereby maintain

that degree of inward self-appreciation without which an unsuccessful life is a little grim. I am convinced that the element of variety which is introduced by the profit system adds something positive to the well-being of the society as a whole. Always provided that we have a minimum basis, and that disparities are not excessive, I very much doubt if it can be improved upon. And if we eradicate this opportunity for the ambitious and adventurous, there is no doubt that they will seek outlet for their impulses in other more dangerous channels. Love of power and intrigue would remain in a society in which private ownership of the means of production and distribution was abolished. ROY HARROD

DRESS REHEARSAL FOR THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN

[*An observer's commentary on the Congress of Europe*]

ONLY the wearer of the shoe can say where it pinches. When nearly a thousand intelligent, educated Europeans of over a score of nationalities, from Iceland to Greece and from Finland to Portugal, meet together to discuss the state of Europe, it is not surprising if they are of one mind concerning its present rottenness. But the Congress of Europe, held at The Hague during the week-end of 7th to 10th May, not only agreed upon a diagnosis of Europe's political, economic, social and cultural ills, but unanimously prescribed a threefold remedy.

A true diagnosis is nine-tenths of the cure. And if it proves efficacious, it becomes somewhat academic to debate the accuracy of the diagnosis.

Let us then study whether the results of the Hague Congress may reasonably be expected to rehabilitate Europe, and thus to heal a wound that is sapping the strength of the entire civilised world.

It became clearly apparent from the start that by "Europe" the Delegates meant "all Europe," meaning also that part of Europe which now lies behind the so-called "Iron Curtain." In terms of geography the Congress was living in the year 1939. During one of the speeches along these lines my mind harked back to a little story I once heard about a peasant in Eastern Poland (or was it Western Russia?) who was asked whether he was Russian or Polish. "Me," he answered, in surprise. "I'm neither; I'm local."

In a continent where boundaries between politically independent states cannot be drawn anywhere without causing injustice and misery to millions of human beings, even the best frontier is no better than a grey veil over a black outlook. Carried away by its own logic, the Congress of Europe drew the boundaries of Europe nowhere, so that it is difficult to see where Europe ends and the world begins. This, of course, is as it should be.

In the first place, the three printed reports submitted to the delegates by the initiating organisations (The Joint International Committee of the Movements for European Unity), asserted that "The British Commonwealth, and the French, Belgian and Dutch Unions, are natural extensions of the European economy . . . European Union has everything to gain from the maintenance . . . of the ties which at present unite the overseas territories with the countries of Western Europe" (Economic Report). "We refuse to accept as permanent the barriers which now separate us from our fellow Europeans in the rest of the Continent. We must continue ceaselessly to hope and work for the unity of all Europe" (Political Report). "Europe may return with renewed confidence to her age-long vocation, a vocation of universality, spreading throughout the world her own culture and opening herself to others . . . Now is the time to rally . . . all the peoples of the continent . . . in a federation which will be the first step towards a Federation of the World" (Cultural Report).

Concerning the Eastern limits of a United Europe, Mr. Churchill's speech at the opening session sounded a note which continually re-echoed throughout the week-end. He proclaimed:—

> "It is necessary for the executive governments of the sixteen countries, associated for the purposes of the Marshall Plan, to make precise arrangements which can apply at present only to what is called Western Europe. In this we wish them well and will give them all loyal support: but our aim here is not confined to Western Europe. We aim at nothing less than all Europe. Distinguished exiles from Czechoslovakia, almost all the Eastern European nations, and also from Spain, are present among us. We aim at nothing less than the eventual participation of all peoples throughout the Continent, whose society and way of life are not in disaccord with a charter of human rights and the sincere expression of Parliamentary democracy. We welcome any country where the people own the Government, and not the Government the people.
>
> "It is not the fault of those who are gathered here to-day, nor of the governments involved in the Marshall Plan or in the Western Union, and least of all the fault of the United States, that the unity of Europe cannot be at present complete. All the States of the East and South-East of Europe are constrained to hold aloof from us and most of them are not allowed to express themselves by free democratic electoral processes. We cannot aim at anything less than the union of Europe as a whole, and we look forward with confidence to the day when this will be achieved."

Similarly, Mr. R. W. G. Mackay, M.P. (Labour), Chairman of the British Delegation, opening the discussion at the first meeting of the Political Committee, emphasised that the discussion was not only about the sixteen Western European States, but also about the "seven or eight" other states further East which must ultimately be brought in.

During the deliberations of the Political Committee of the Congress, a resolution was moved, and was ultimately referred to a subcommittee, dealing with the "special case" of Spain, and outlining a method by which Spain could acquire a democratic government; "the only way Spain can take its place in United Europe."

This was reflected in the final resolution which was eventually agreed unanimously by the Congress in plenary session, and which laid down ideological boundaries for the union: "The resultant union or federation should be open to all European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human Rights . . . a Commission should be set up to undertake immediately the double task of drafting such a Charter and of laying down standards to which a State must conform if it is to deserve the name of a democracy." The resolution goes on to say that a state is not a democracy unless it does, "in fact as well as in law, guarantee to its citizens liberty of thought, assembly and expression, as well as the right to form a political opposition." In the wise words of the Cultural Report: "It is these liberties, and not the labels attached to them, that the peoples of Europe are determined to safeguard."

The ideological qualifications for membership appear to be essential, particularly when it is realised that a federation degenerates into a league of national blocs if the separate states (or some of them) are totalitarian. But only reasons of strategy (which, however, the Congress did not specify) could justify the geographical limitations implied in the word "European." Would not the admission of Sweden and Italy be a more difficult proposition, strategically speaking, than that of (say) Equador or Peru?

Rather than leave a hole in its map of Europe, which would have spoiled the picture, the Congress unanimously decided, in full session, "that the sole solution of the economic and political problems of Germany is its integration in a federated Europe." The use of the word "sole" was hotly and energetically debated, and at one o'clock in the morning some of us observers who had been trying to cover the work of all three commissions were able to relax in our chairs and catch up on our sleep while a pathetic white-haired Frenchman who shall be nameless harangued his weary colleagues along the lines that the Germans will cause the next war if they are treated like human beings. Not a word about their being so easily

led and organised that they must be organised in the service of peace; just the same old "Never-Again" croak to which Dr. Goebbels paid such grateful tribute in his diary!

Let me say here that if I had attended the Congress of Europe as a Delegate, instead of as a pressman, I should have wished to speak against certain proposals, to change a stress here or there, and particularly to alter the timing of the programmes finally agreed. I should, however, have voted in favour of all three reports. The unanimity which emanated from the Congress is, to my mind, nothing of a miracle; neither is it due to minorities having been oppressed, suppressed or browbeaten. It is "all hands to the pumps" when the ship is sinking.

However, few who heard Senator Pieter Kerstens (Netherlands) introducing us to each other when he opened the first plenary session, would have expected such complete agreement to proceed from such a heterogeneous gathering. "Little more than a year ago," said Kerstens, "it was largely thought utopian to bring together socialists, liberals and conservatives, religious believers and free-thinkers, big employers, bankers, financiers, economists and trade union leaders, parliamentarians and scholars, military people and artists, under one common denominator, that is to say to bring all those divergent individuals together on a programme of common interest. To-day this utopian ideal has become a fact. Once more the idealists have proved to be more practical than the self-styled realists."

For at least ten years, pioneers have been preaching the principles of modern federalism, whereby they believe that different peoples and divergent views could be synthesised into an organic whole which would unite what must be united and yet permit diversity to flourish where it is necessary and desirable, thereby strengthening rather than weakening the whole. I went to The Hague as a pilgrim to Mecca, firm in the faith that good would come from it, yet with little knowledge upon which any confident prophecy could have been based. Few of us who there assembled could have predicted that Mr. Duncan Sandys, in his speech winding up the Congress, could be able to proclaim so unequivocally:—

> "The objectives we had in mind when we decided to organise this Congress were threefold: first to demonstrate the widespread support which exists for the cause of European unity; secondly, to secure an exchange of views and arrive at agreed recommendations for action; and, thirdly, to provide a new and powerful impetus to the campaign.
>
> Having regard to all the political uncertainties and controversies with which we were confronted, we realised that there was a risk of failure or fiasco. But in great enterprises great

risks have to be taken. If, as at one time appeared possible, important elements in the life of Europe had altogether abstained from participation, the Congress might have been robbed of its influence and authority. By your presence, many of you at considerable personal sacrifice, you have made this the most representative assembly of independent citizens that has ever met to deliberate upon the fate of Europe.

Had our debates revealed, as they might have done, deep rifts in our ranks or irreconcilable divergencies upon policy, the holding of this Congress would have weakened and not strengthened our cause. There have of course been differences of opinion in certain matters as there always will be wherever free men meet together to discuss their affairs. But I think you will agree that our debates have resulted in a most remarkable measure of agreement . . ."

The measure of agreement was, indeed, remarkable. What was more remarkable still, however, was the nature of the agreement.

To the dismay of those who had come to The Hague to take a great step forward in the evolution of a new, peaceful world society, caution had been the keynote of the opening speeches at Friday's plenary session. The London *Times,* conservative once more under its timid new editor, hailed with delight the next morning the news that both Mr. Churchill and Monsieur Ramadier had repudiated "any federalist revolution," and went on to comment that "only the course of debate at The Hague will reveal how far these opening speeches will satisfy those delegates who desire to set up a new and untried scheme of international government on the ground over which established Governments, chosen by the people, are already working together."

Nothing could have expressed more succinctly the issues for which The Hague was to be the battleground.* Nobody could have foreseen that the anti-federalists would have so easily and so tamely succumbed to those who wanted to try an "untried" scheme if only because leagues and *con*federal structures had failed everywhere and every time they had been tried.

In the opinion of many present, it became a matter of urgent practical politics to thrash out and decide the controversy which had hitherto been regarded as academic: whether "Governments chosen by the people" are the right agencies to choose the members of an international "authority," or whether international authority should be wielded by representatives elected directly by the people themselves. In the Political Committee, Mr. Kristensen, a Danish

* Federation *versus* confederation, government *versus* debating society, national sovereignty *versus* peace, league *versus* genuine Union.

delegate, agreed with a Swedish delegate that "union must not be a union of governments alone, but a union of peoples, parliaments, trades unions, professional organisations and the like." Monsieur Pierre Reynaud (France) asserted that "the only solution is a European assembly. If the parliaments of the separate nations elect the representatives to the assembly, this would mean that its members had elected themselves."*

Monsieur Reynaud became the leader of a vigorous drive to have an elected European assembly based on "one citizen, one vote," rather than on the confederal (league) principle of State equality. M. Reynaud was emphatic that this must be established within six months. The Committee regretfully decided that, even if a Constituent Assembly could be appointed without any delay whatever, it would be some months before a Constitution were drafted. This would have to be ratified before the European Parliament could be elected, and it was therefore unrealistic to expect results as soon as M. Reynaud hoped. The resolution which was eventually passed unanimously by the Congress in plenary session demanded the convening, as a matter of real urgency, of what would virtually be a Constituent Assembly to prepare the juridical and constitutional plans for the creation of a European "union or federation" and to report on its labours within three months.

The change of tempo from "cautious" to "urgent" came just after Ramadier's first speech on the first day. Dr. Henri Brugmans leaped into action with a challenging speech in which he admitted that liberty was being undermined by the lack of faith of the Europeans in themselves, but he denied that they had lost their taste for rebellion. "We are not at all, not in the slightest interested," he reiterated, "not in the least bit interested in diplomatic structures like the old League of Nations or a European U.N.O. . . . No useful purpose will be served by continuing to proliferate intergovernmental committees. No assembly of sovereign powers will ever save us. We want the creation of federal European institutions with full powers, capable of bringing into existence a new League of Free Peoples."

From that time on, one could see the aptness of a little story circulated by a wag with a sense of parable, about the glum little man discovered by a friend on the fringe of a tumultuous mob during the French Revolution. He was asked: "Why do you tag

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* Monsieur P. O. Lapie (France), the spokesman of the Procedural Committee of the Commission, contended that "equality must be established as between men, not as between states." Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, speaking in the name of the European Parliamentary Union, insisted that the peoples and parliaments of Europe were readier than their governments to accept federation. "Let us think in terms of people rather than of Governments!"

along with this canaille?" "I have to," he replied, "I'm their leader."

Nevertheless, M. Ramadier had still not quite caught up with his followers when the time came for his speech at the mass meeting at Amsterdam, whereupon a young Dutch woman who happened to be at my elbow commented: "The baroque style! Talking about the old Europe and forgetting to speak about the new!" Her compatriot Professor Berkelbach van den Sprenkel speedily remedied this by demanding a common government and one army for Europe.

There seemed to be general disapproval of the league type of organisation for conducting international affairs. An attempt in the Political Committee, by Mr. Manningham-Buller, M.P., to delete a reference to U.N.O. being insufficient to provide law and order was defeated by 82 votes to 72. The majority of the delegates seemed to consider that workable international political machinery was needed to enable interests that are identical or mutually interdependent to be brought into—and kept in—harmony, and to ensure that those interests which conflict or compete among themselves cannot, within the framework of European society, lead to war. As Mr. Mackay and others argued, a European parliament, provided that it was directly elected, would divide the inevitable antagonisms into party groupings rather than into national blocs. Faction is one of the risks inseparable from democracy; but when the factions happen to possess their own geographical frontiers and their separate and independent Foreign Offices, War Offices, Armies, Navies, Air Forces and Atom Bomb plants, democracy retires from the scene. The Congress of Europe decided that democracy must leap the frontiers, commencing in Europe, by the time-honoured process of: constituent assembly, drafting of a constitution, ratification of the constitution, and the election of an international parliament with governmental power in international affairs. This, in the words used by Mr. Churchill at Amsterdam, is the design of a Federation "whose moral conceptions will win the respect and gratitude of mankind and whose physical strength will be such that none will dare molest her tranquil sway." HAROLD S. BIDMEAD.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORAL EDUCATION

[*A memorandum prepared for the Ethical Union's Summer School on The Moral Aspect of Education*]

Total Education

EDUCATION of the whole person for a complete life, a philosophic aim, must always be the test of educational systems and programmes. Of course, practice in this field, as in every other, does not wait for the advent of a conclusive uncontested outcome of theoretical discussion; the pressure of social needs and public demands forms the educational policies of the day; but a social philosophy is implied and may be made more or less explicit in declarations of policy and formulations of schemes; and a critical examination of this philosophy with reference to the total purpose of education is always relevant.

It is characteristic of Plato's thought that his philosophy is itself a theory of education. In the *Republic,* although he is preoccupied with the question of the best education for his Guardians in order that the good life for all may be instituted and sustained, the essential thought is that in a society radically reformed by rational institutions the ordered life of the community is itself the education of man. The same thought underlies More's *Utopia.* This is to state the educator's dilemma and skip the problem of education, for it remains necessary to educate for society and against society, to prepare for the actual world and to make a little easier the difficult possibility of a better one.

When the education of a gentleman is discussed by Montaigne, or Milton, or (best of all) Locke, they are not at all thinking of a rational order of society but idealising a select present company amongst whom it is honour to be numbered: the requisite qualities, accomplishments, skills, and the pursuits and modes of life, are presupposed rather than set down as aims; at the same time is intended a critique of current pedagogy and of contemporary manners, a partial reform of the education which socializes rather than a radical reform of the society which educates. Locke touches on all the major aspects of education (intellectual, moral, physical, aesthetic, social, technical) and selects their contribution to the completeness of a gentleman, for in the gentleman there is scorn of the specialist. As Milton puts it in his rather ridiculous tract: "I call therefore a complete and generous education, that which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war." It is education for status, and for the exercise of authority and scope.

The true universality of education, not class-bound and not in servitude to culture, begins with the educators proper, like Pestalozzi

and Froebel, whose programmes are based on the study of child development correlated with the ordered content of the experience of man. This approach has not until recent times won for education its universality, for until recent times the education of the poor was philanthropic, utilitarian, or for the better security of church or class power. The need for social union and for the fullest utilization of the nation's talent, the demand for equality of opportunity and for social equality, the political power of organized labour: these social forces, added to the direct approach of the pioneers as developed in the more recent scientific study of education, have laid the practical foundation (not only in this country) of a total education whose philosophy has not the intellectualist bias of Plato and Aristotle, nor the class basis of Montaigne and Locke, but is universal in its particularity and particular in its universality. Each of the major aspects of education with which Locke was concerned, enumerated above, will figure in each of the three courses proposed for the secondary school, but integrated in each type of school on a different plan.

A seemingly inexhaustible field of educational research of the first importance is indicated by the question of how the characteristic differences of aptitude, capacity, and interest which mark the threefold division of secondary education (and will be followed by characteristic differences of social function, habits, and style of life) react with the different possibilities of intellectual, moral, aesthetic, social, and even physical and technical, education, considered in terms of material, treatment and method, and aim. The fundamental characteristics of intelligence, mature personality, aesthetic appreciation, and physical development may be assumed to be universal and the same for all. But they appear manifestly different in different contexts and are not to be produced by the same methods in different types. It will not be disputed that arts and crafts, sciences, and civics may be taught without giving any genuine aesthetic, intellectual, and ethical insight and training. As a *tour de force* it would be perfectly possible to give such genuine insight and training without any reference to or use of arts, sciences, or citizenship. Between these unlikely extremes there is plenty of room for experiment and research. We do not know what the possibilities are of educating the great majority of the nation in the Secondary Modern schools. It is not good enough to be content with giving these schools a practical bias. It is necessary to find effective and appropriate ways of adapting materials and methods under each of the aspects of education so that a complete education is achieved in every type of school.

The adaptation of education has to be made of course not only to the inborn factors but also to the social background of the pupils

and their prospective lives. Theoretically, the content of secondary education is in the melting-pot. The most serious problem in contemporary education is to introduce into the secondary phase the necessary diversity without sacrifice of the principles of equality and completeness. Completeness is as much in danger in vocational and in academic education as it is in the Secondary Modern school, perhaps indeed it is more in danger; and if care is taken for the achievement of an essential completeness, equality can be left to take care of itself.

The Moral Aspect

Moral education for the most part in England to-day is still consciously traditional, taken for granted, or confused with religious instruction and training for citizenship. This aspect has had nothing like the careful study, research, and theoretical elaboration which have been given to the intellectual, physical, and vocational aspects, studies which in sum have transformed the whole outlook and practice of education. Yet English education has a reputation for successful character training. It may be said that we have specialized in it as the French have specially stressed intellectual discipline and the Germans formerly stressed technical education. Educational journals in these three countries during the early months of the first world war, attempting to assess the contribution of their national systems of education to the nation's war effort, explicitly founded their confidence, in Germany on technical competence, in France on intellectual adaptability and suppleness, in Britain on character. Sir Richard Livingstone, speaking on the training of character in education, says, "The British boarding school is hitherto the finest factory of citizenship in existence."

Whatever the success of our public schools has been, since Arnold of Rugby, in producing civic virtue and team spirit, the extension of the same methods to all schools is not necessarily wise, even if it were practicable. The public schools may be allowed to remain strongholds of unrepentant traditionalism, but their spokesmen must not be allowed to rule national policies, and it would not be difficult to show that their counsels have dominated the reports of the official committees whose recommendations have been the main influence on educational policy. In this field, it is a time for doubt and the recognition of ignorance, as a first step to better things. Professor R. A. C. Oliver in his little book *Research in Education* (Allen & Unwin, 1945), has something to say on this point.

As a final example of the need for inquiry to dissipate ignorance, we may instance the whole subject of character education. English educationists have prided themselves, more perhaps

than on anything, on their success in educating character, and educationists from other countries have accepted our valuation. Yet it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we do not know what we are doing or how we do it. A foreign headmaster was visiting schools in an English county. He told the director of education he would like to see something of our character-building activities. The director was at a complete loss and did not know what to show him. After some discussion it was decided to exhibit such features of our school life as the school assembly, the house and prefect systems, team games and school societies. Perhaps this was not a good selection; but in any case do we really know what effect these activities have on the development of children's characters, or how they produce their effect? Is there any valid evidence, for example, that formal moral precepts improve children's conduct, that the house-system develops a quality of leadership, that team games develop the team spirit or sublimate sexual interests? How in fact do we educate character? Does the reading of good literature refine and extend children's sympathies? Do art and handwork, music and dancing, give them outlets for feelings which would otherwise manifest themselves in less desirable forms of behaviour? Do children adopt and act on the suggestions the teacher is constantly letting fall, as a rule casually and unconsciously, as when he accepts or rejects tale-telling or encourages or discourages the expression of personal opinion? There are in our schools sharply contrasted systems of discipline, of rewards and punishments, of pupil self-government; what are their relative effects on children's moral standards, their conduct, their attitudes, their social behaviour? Inquiry into such questions might dissipate our ignorance and cause us to modify some of our practices; it would probably also freshen the air in some of our schools.

Connected with the strength of traditionalism in moral education, obscuring new views and standing in the way of a fresh approach, is the strength of the religious interest. There is a secular strand in the history of western educational traditions;* nevertheless, education has been mainly in the hands of religious bodies and it has been a leading interest of the Church to dominate education. No impartial study of the history of education can fail to bring this home. One sees it conspicuously to-day in the struggle of the Catholic Church with the Communist State in certain European countries (for example, Poland) for control of the schools and youth organizations. In this country there is no political issue between

* Educational Traditions in the English-speaking Countries. By Nicholas Hans. Year Book of Education, 1941.

church and state; there is a compromise on the position of the churches in the schools which is likely to last a long time, although how it will work out in practice is still uncertain. The Christian faith has a traditional place in the schools, not challenged by public opinion, and it has for so long and in such ways been bound up with the idea and the practice of moral education that to disentangle the two, although indispensable to a proper study of the matter, is a difficult and a delicate undertaking. By contrast, in the French state schools there is a strong republican tradition of secular education in which the moral aspect is identified with civic virtue unconnected with religion.

To indicate more precisely the religious assumptions of British policy in moral education, one can instance two of the major reports of recent years, enlightened and inspiring documents, the Spens report on Secondary Education (1938) and the Norwood report on the Curriculum in Secondary Schools (1941). The Spens report, defining Religious Education as "the education which inculcates duty and reverence", puts it in the forefront of the curriculum. An emphasized and detailed chapter is given to the teaching of Scripture, which is taken to be not identical with Religious Education but the basis of it and the means of it. The difficulties created by divisions of opinion are formally recognized but dismissed on the ground that "no boy or girl can be counted as properly educated unless he or she has been made aware of the fact of the existence of a religious interpretation of life"; and "Scripture should be taught primarily with a view to the understanding of what the books of the Bible were in fact intended to mean by their authors". This "objective" teaching is at the same time an instrument of intellectual discipline, a means of bringing liberal Christians and near-Christians into willing association with the work (solving the difficulty of different opinions), and an introduction to a religious interpretation of life. But the real intention is that it shall be the means of Religious Education.

> It will be a natural development if religious instruction is often so directed as to add meaning to whatever form of school worship is customary in the school, and if the latter in turn brings fresh interest to the work in the classroom. In any school which provides for daily prayers of a Christian character, with, as is often the case, a lection from the Bible, it is reasonable for those who teach the Bible to make it clear that the religion contained in the New Testament challenges us to faith and worship; and that school prayers are no mere formality, nor a traditional method of promoting corporate spirit, but an acceptance of that challenge. To keep school prayers and religious instruction in

entirely separate compartments is to detract from the value of both. (p. 216)

Whether or not this approach is suspected of being disingenuous, it slips into regarding moral education as religious education and religious education as education in the Christian faith. In this respect the Spens report is followed, and quoted, by the Norwood report. In a central passage the moral aspect is recognized and focused as a primary and continual aim, although it is not adequately characterised.

> There are three elements which are essential to a good education; we call them elements because they are not subjects in the usual sense of that word, though they nevertheless have their defined place in the curriculum. They are not limited to set hours or set places; they pervade the life of the school, in and out of the class room, they are the concern of all who take a share in guiding its work and its play, and upon a right attitude towards them and upon a right treatment of them depends a major part of the achievement of the school in its primary task of realising the powers of the individual pupil and of equipping him as a member of society. These elements, which in our view are more than subjects because in one form or another they run through almost every activity, intellectual and other, which a school fosters, are (i) training of the body, (ii) training of character, (iii) training in habits of clear thought and clear expression of thought in the English language.
>
> In other words we maintain that every teacher, if he is to do the best for the pupils committed to his charge, must regard as within his province and as of supreme importance the attitude of each pupil to his own bodily welfare, to moral and spiritual ideals and to the clear and correct use of his own language.
>
> According to this view, no matter what may be the subject or subjects to which a teacher may give most of his time, the subject or subjects should be of minor importance to him compared with the general welfare of the "whole" pupil, regarded as a being who is possessed of a physical body, who is moved by ideals of conduct and thought to a certain behaviour, individual and social, and who needs for the formation and expression of ideas a sure power of using his own language. (p. 66)

These are bold words and in their context they are given the full stress of emphatic thought. A chapter is devoted to each of the three "elements" here distinguished, and the chapter on the moral element is headed Religious Education, and is confessedly an addendum to the chapter on Scripture in the Spens report.

There is a case, perhaps a strong case, for secular education, but

that is not here to the point, for the Education Act of 1944 lays down a definitive policy for the immediate future within which educational study and reform will go on. But whatever the present and the ultimate place of the Christian faith in the schools may be, there is no reason and no justification for holding that religious instruction is moral education or the essence of moral education. So long as the Christian religion is taught in schools it will inevitably make its specific contribution to moral education. Christians will consider that it is an indispensable contribution, and non-Christians may think that it is an unnecessary one or perhaps a mischievous one. That controversy does not belong to educational research. Educators concerned with moral education are concerned with the contribution of every subject in the curriculum, every principle of school organization, every school activity and phase of school life. So long as religious instruction has a place in the schools, its effects have to be taken into account and its possibilities reckoned with. But educators can no more enter into the ultimate controversy than they can decide the disputes between moral philosophers. At the same time, they cannot altogether ignore these differences. The difficulty is well stated (and it is the first recognition in any official publication that there really is any serious difficulty at all) in the section on the Moral Factor in *School and Life,* the first report of the Central Advisory Council for Education (England). The writer of the section distinguishes three traditions as sources of moral ideals: the classical humanist tradition, the Christian tradition, and the scientific secular tradition.

> Thus when one comes to consider the basic convictions on which the teaching of moral standards is to rest, there is a real divergence of view. To many, the Christian beliefs which in the past supported our moral teaching no longer make sense, although the moral values still make a strong appeal. To insist upon the beliefs appears an affront to the intellectual integrity of such men and women. On the other hand we are faced with an equally sincere assertion that if our moral standards are to be maintained it is essential to preserve Christian beliefs . . .
>
> There is no quick and easy solution of the problem; what must be assured is that children are given the opportunity to see the value of the various threads which make up our tradition, and absorb, as part of their moral inheritance, the virtues of each. A historical sense, and fairness of intellectual judgment demand that due place be given in our education to all three elements. Above all we must insist that whatever choice is made must be a matter which allows for the exercise of intellectual and moral freedom. The beliefs must be honestly held, the way of life freely chosen.

The section concludes:—

> The preceding paragraphs will have illustrated a fact which is familiar enough to all who are concerned with the upbringing of the young, that the task of giving moral and religious guidance is one of great difficulty. The solution must be sought by the patient and honest statement and discussion of divergent views by those who sincerely hold them. It is a long term, not a short term, problem.

The differences of view which make this long term problem will and should be debated by teachers in their training, and they will probably crop up in the schools in the later years of secondary education, but moral education need not and should not be subordinated at any stage to such questions; as the system of education itself need not be, and in a free society must not be, an instrument of a particular philosophy. This principle is being called in question, and not only by totalitarian marxist states;* but to abandon it is to abandon generous educational ideals and the hope of universality, and to fall back on a bleak sectarianism. A practical empirical approach is essential to education in a democracy, and it is as feasible and appropriate in the moral as in the intellectual content of education.

Further, the moral aspect of education, if it is to be systematically studied and radically planned, must be disentangled from training in citizenship, which is not co-extensive with it. The claims of training for citizenship, as of religious instruction, can be enlarged to cover and stand for moral education. The question suffers from the confusion which has been introduced in this way. "We are human beings before we are citizens," as Coleridge said, and although any improvement of our quality as human beings is necessarily an improvement of our quality as citizens, the specific qualities of the good citizen, like the specific qualities of the Christian believer, are the result of specific training and instruction. Training for citizenship requires direct instruction in the history and working of institutions, knowledge of the subject matter which will enable the citizen to think for himself on contemporary problems, and practice in reasoning and in the detection of fallacies. All this is necessary, and moral education would be lame without it; but it is not the main content of moral education, and a good deal of its content is specifically intellectual.

The Main Aims

Nothing more can be said to the point without first stating what the aims of moral education may be taken to be. Aims already

* See, for example, *The University and the Modern World*, by A. S. Nash; and *Education: Christian or Pagan?* by M. V. C. Jeffreys.

implicit in the schools which may be emphasized and formalized for discussion are these: (1) efficiency, the cultivation of personal qualities necessary to adequacy and achievement; (2) dependability, the cultivation of qualities which make one ready and able to take and discharge responsibilities; (3) acceptability, the cultivation of the qualities and manners which make one socially agreeable; (4) inspiration, the seeding of interests and purposes, the generation of imaginative response; (5) insight, instruction in the meaning and movement of the moral order; (6) orientation, the choice and plan of life. These are the largest aims of human aspiration, and at the same time they are the constant themes of school life. The point of studying and stressing the moral aspect of education is not to suggest that such aims are new to the schools, but solely to inquire how they may be fulfilled more consistently and systematically. How can the resources of the schools be fully used and expanded for this purpose; which aims should appropriately dominate the different phases and types of education; what sequences should be followed?

The aims as listed are vague and require further statement. (1) The experience of achievement, the technique of achievement, the pattern and the concept of achievement, the evaluation of achievement: here is a progressive awareness and mastery basic to all enjoyment and to all usefulness. There has always been the opportunity in schools for pupils to distinguish themselves in athletics and scholarship, there has always been insistence on high standards, and the encouragement and praise of excellence. These traditional things will always be important and should never be belittled. Nevertheless, concentration on prizes and first-rate performance, useful though it is to society, can hardly fail to blur the recognition, even more important and useful, that achievement is necessary to any form of satisfactory living and is open to all levels of ability. It is to give practical effect to this recognition that diversity is necessary in the secondary schools. Achievement begins early with the acquisition of primary skills and the experience of confidence, competence, and adequacy in exercising them. This is fundamental to personal development, social adjustment, and emotional maturity. There is no compensation for failure to acquire thorough competence in the basic skills; and therefore the work of testing and bringing children up to normal standards is all important in the early stages. Experience of achievement through the acquisition of skills and their successful social use, so that the child is weaned of dependence upon adults and enabled to find a place and play a part in a society of contemporaries, winning acceptance and establishing his adequacy, this is the indispensable primary stage of moral education. Later, the content of achievement is deeper and the reach

more exacting; and there is room and need for the analysis and evaluation of achievements of different kinds, personal and collective, historical and contemporary, using a wide range of materials. Thus children can be made thoroughly familiar with this basic moral concept which runs through all human living. They should never be led, or allowed to fall, into the way of thinking of achievement as exceptional and distinguished performance. The concept belongs to the grammar of morals and is not to be identified with the classics.

(2) Similarly, dependability is not something to be developed in those capable of leadership to whom come responsible positions in the school. The frequent experience of being counted on for something, of undertaking a part, or having the care of other interests, is essential to all, and is not to be had by being merely a member of a school or a house or a team and imbibing *esprit de corps;* it requires the playing of many parts in many kinds of project, enterprise, and activity for the sake of an enjoyed or a useful purpose. This is the fibre of which the whole fabric of school organization is to be made, and it engenders public spirit rather than *esprit de corps.* Situational response, which is the essence of this matter, can only be obtained by the constant contrivance and recurrence of interesting situations.

(3) The qualities which make one agreeable and acceptable are to be cultivated from the outset, and are neither negligible nor something which has to be left to grace. The child who in the primary phases of education is successfully incorporated in a group will be suggestible and respond to the expectations of the group, which can (only too easily) be made to reflect those of the teacher in charge. This matter of manners and acceptable habits is appropriately dealt with in this way. Carefulness to be pleasing and not offensive, although a contribution to smooth relations and pleasant living, is small by comparison with the high importance of the habit of taking others seriously, the will to make oneself understood and to learn what the attitudes and views of others really are. Nothing is easier (or more common) than to slide into a world of illusions made by one's own preconceptions and self-projections and the patterns of thought adopted from the group to which one adheres. It is only by an effort that one dissolves these stereotypes and attends directly to what is objectively there. This is at bottom a moral matter because it is a case of using others as means, instruments, and occasions, and not as ends; a case of taking the self as the only real and the subjective as the necessary standard; but it is best dealt with in the intellectual field, through the discipline of studying an author's mind, the full meaning of a passage or a statement, of discovering the individuality of minds covered by the

label Christian or Communist, through the practice of genuine discussion, and by mixing with others of different type, interests, and background. Social education, learning to work, play, live, communicate, co-operate with others, is more important in the modern world of specialization than ever it was. This is fundamental citizenship. The test of education is that it leads not only to self-education but also to mutual education.

(4) The great objective world of human achievement and human failure, of crisis, problem, and difficult possibility, sifted, simplified, and interpreted in the subject-matter and teaching of the secondary school curricula, is the main means by which each new generation is given (or is not given) the will to live generously and creatively. If preoccupation with techniques, disciplines, and indispensable drudgery takes the place of inspirational teaching in the secondary schools, education is a moral failure. Inspiration is not vagueness, but concreteness, the vision of what is there, and engagement of sympathies and interests because of the exciting nature of what is there. This matter of saving the essence of the subject, and subordinating means to ends, within the compass of the secondary course, is the moral aspect of education, because the content of the subjects corresponds to the formative content of imagination, the substance of ideals, the inwardness and sensitiveness of formal responses. The impressionistic and ideational content of education derived from the study of school subjects is not the least formative element in education and in the secondary school it is dominant.

(5) Direct teaching of ethical theory even in the highest form in grammar schools is at best unlikely to be profitable. But a broad analysis of human nature and human relations can be extremely helpful. Recognition and understanding of contractual, compulsory, and affectional types of relationship and of these elements in all relationships; study of different patterns of conflicting interests and of interdependent and identical interests, and of their psychology and institutional setting; understanding of the essential reciprocity of moral relations, the composite but indivisible good which they subserve, and the characteristic forms of their degeneration; clear perception of the permanent and the impermanent in the moral order, the place and force of new claims; a conception of the complex order of human good in the whole economy of a civilization: the communication of such insight into human relations and human good is the surest way to get the right balance of independence and co-operativeness, subordination and assertiveness, to reduce the production of the naïve, the cunning, and the muddled well-meaning, and avoid the false idealism which makes prigs, martyrs, or cynics. Some idea of the essentials can be given and ought to be given at the highest level in secondary schools or during further education.

(6) Conscious creative control of environment and of destiny is a function of human living and a part of education. During the educational phases the environment and the development of the individual are controlled and planned for him. At the end he must be put in the way of planning his own course. There is the structure, movement, and management of his career, and there is the content and choice; in both he needs help. The structure and movement of a career, the question of phasing and timing and management, can be dealt with in a short course at the end of the secondary school or during further education. This is an essential matter but a matter of technique, the formal unity in diversity of a life fully lived and competently managed. The matter of choice and content, which includes vocational guidance, is essentially the giving of determinate shape and character to the impressions received in the inspirational phase of education in the secondary school; it is a first harvest of purposes, interests, and values. Such matters cannot be dealt with in a course; and there is continuity between the doubts, difficulties, and decisions of this transition to the world of adult self-dependence and the minor adjustments and developmental anxieties and crises of the school career itself. There is, then, the question of the continuity of guidance and the responsibility for guidance. In American High Schools in recent years there has been a movement for the appointment of trained personnel workers as counsellors solely for guidance and orientation work. Their function is to help individual pupils to recognize and solve their own problems and to make the fullest use for their personal development of all the resources available and of the various agencies working for their education. In this country tradition is against such appointments and relies on house masters, form masters, tutors, or headmasters for the personal responsibility for individual pupils in relation to their welfare, problems, and all-round development. In France, an experiment on other lines is being tried in selected schools. No doubt some needs and some pupils are better served by one system than another; there are advantages and disadvantages in all, and the type of school helps to settle the question in many cases. In large multi-lateral schools there would seem to be reason for trying the American method of appointing specialists trained for the work. In all such experiments the issue turns on the question of whether on the whole such work is better done by specialists and what kind of training best fits them for the work.

The Main Phases

In the primary school the child is to become consciously adequate in the exercise and use of primary skills. He is to play many parts and help to create a common life in the class and the school.

This experience of competence and acceptance in the life of a group, with establishment of group standards and judgments, and the stabilizing of feelings and aims, is primary education: it is more or less self-contained, and if the acquisition of the skills and the social adaptation and experience are perfected, what is learned of the outside world is of secondary importance.

In the secondary phase, the same process goes on, with the development and acquisition of skills, the playing of more complicated, varied, and important roles, nearer the life of the world, and the further development of communal judgments and expectations. But the content of the subjects studied and interests pursued has now pre-eminent importance. History, literature, science, art are disciplines offering the means by which experience is gained, verified, and created; but their content gives the themes, the interest, the challenge, the demands of human living. At this time the main themes must be struck out, the concrete appeal brought home; later is the time for review, analysis, selection, and development. The actual concepts, insights, experiences which from the moral standpoint should be gained from each study have to be determined in each case. There can be and there should be clear formulations of what the essential requirements are for this purpose from the teaching of each subject.

In general, it can usefully be said that from the moral standpoint the leading theme in the primary phase is socialization; in the secondary phase, inspiration; and in the later stages and in further education it is orientation. If these themes are sacrificed to the necessities of academic work or intellectual development, or to any other exigencies, it is the moral aspect of education that is being sacrificed.

A Concerted Policy

Total education within its diverse types has several aspects and phases, and is in the hands of many persons employing various materials for specific purposes. The multiplicity of appropriate parts is essential to it, no less than their appropriate relations and mutual reinforcement. Thus it requires a concerted policy and the coordination of factors. Obviously this is a long-term achievement, and presupposes agreements won piecemeal, after much research, experiment and discussion, in connection with each aspect and phase, each type of school and subject. Parents, teachers, doctors, psychologists, administrators, are apt to regard very differently the same qualities in the same children. Such differences when they reveal themselves are startling and lead to gloomy views, but even much narrower differences of outlook and aim may have serious results. Education of the whole person for a complete life presupposes a universal philosophy, which is very remote indeed; but the approach to it in the field of education is empirical, step by step

on all the fronts on which we march, and that way we can proceed with confidence and vigour. The moral aspect of education is not the ultimate aim, but it offers a big field of study and immediate systematic work. Its importance has not been overlooked or neglected, but effectiveness has been hampered by traditions, assumptions, and confusions which demand a fresh approach. Such a revision of accepted aims and methods is overdue in the normal course of educational development: in the present state of the world it is an urgent social demand. H. J. BLACKHAM

REVIEW ARTICLE

Marxism and Humanism

THE WITCH-HUNT of Communists in America has left its mark on this volume of essays* celebrating the Centenary of the Communist Manifesto. Evidently, the editors felt that it would be too dangerous if they treated Marxism as a living issue of today. The Russian interpretation of Marxism is nowhere mentioned. Most of the essays are studies in origins. Interesting light is thrown upon Winstanley, Saint Simon, Weitling, some of the forerunners of Marx in socialist theory. These three theoreticians were the several interpreters of the social revolution in England, France, and Germany. In England the period of revolutionary ferment lasted from 1640 to 1688, in France from 1789 to 1848. In both these countries there was a transfer of power from a semi-feudal land-owning aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. In Germany, the revolutionary ferment, which came to a head in 1848, ended unhappily in failure. There was no transfer of power to the bourgeoisie. Two world wars have been fought in order to discover with which class in German society power lies. And the question is still unsettled. Mankind has had to pay dearly for the belated development of Germany. When we recall that the Civil War in England overlapped the desolating Thirty Years War between German Protestants and Catholics, we can appreciate some of the causes for Germany's political and economic backwardness.

Whenever there is a struggle for power between two classes in a nation—and power is primarily economic—the Marxian interpretation of history is illuminating. Some of our most eminent historians have written about the English Civil War. There are Tory, Whig, and Puritan interpretations. But as Christopher Hill points out, an interpretation in terms of the class struggle, however shocking it may be to the conventional historian, may nevertheless fit the historic facts more adequately than any rival theory.

Moreover, the Marxists can claim that their interpretation fits both the French and English Revolutions, and explains the

*A Centenary of Marxism. New York: *Science and Society*, 1948.

differences just as much as the similarities between them. Cromwell and Napoleon, the Levellers and the Babouvists, Charles I and Louis XVI, Charles II and Louis XVIII, James II and Charles X, and finally the bourgeois Dutch William and the bourgeois Louis Philippe.

And if the Marxists are asked why the class struggle in France has been so much fiercer than in England and why it is still undecided, they have their answer. England is a country where the aristocracy and the proletariat take on a bourgeois stamp. Every modern Englishman is, or aspires to be, a bourgeois. And there are good historical reasons for this class homogeneity. To begin with, the Wars of the Roses liquidated the old feudal aristocracy. The new Tudor aristocracy had either bourgeois origins or bourgeois affiliations. And the Tudors liquidated the Catholic Church, which was the stoutest pillar of the feudal régime. France had to wait until 1789 for the direct onslaught on the feudal church and aristocracy. And the onslaught has not proved decisive. Modern France is in part Catholic, in part agnostic, but it is not Protestant. Nor can it be said that bourgeois democracy has even now become naturalised in France.

Marxism is at its best when it treats of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and when it analyses the causes of the instability of capitalism. But is Marxism an adequate philosphy of world history? And if it is not, what philosophy of history might be adequate? The first question is critical for the future of Soviet civilisation, the second for the future of mankind.

The first point we must note is that Marxism has a strictly limited interest in history. Marxism is not an interpretation of world history. What it interprets is West European history from the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution. Marxism analyses the process by which the bourgeois capitalist wrested power from the feudal landlord and prophesies that what the landlord suffered at the hands of the capitalist, the capitalist will suffer at the hands of the proletarian. And the capitalist and the proletarian that Marxism has in mind are both of them of the West European variety.

But world history does not begin with the Renaissance, nor will it end when the proletarian masses of Europe have come into power. Hegel, to do him justice, had a vision which swept out the whole content of human history. The history upon which Hegel philosophises has some claims to be considered world wide. But even Hegel is parochial. His line of real interest extends from the Graeco-Roman to the Christo-Germanic civilisations. It is true that Hegel has something to say about the Chinese, Indian, and Islamic civilisations which were beginning to be known and

studied in his lifetime. Also, he finds a place in his system for Ancient Egypt, and for Ancient Persia. But the civilisations, as Hegel understands them, are not economic and political realities. They are only ideas. They are the ideal forms in which the Spirit of History—and the Spirit of History is ultimately identical with the Spirit of the Universe—elects to clothe itself. The civilisations are experiments in living, conducted by civilised societies; and civilised societies cannot exist unless they invent and apply suitable techniques for controlling the natural and social environment. These are empirical truths which have no place in Hegel's metaphysical view of history.

For the vision of world history which is forming itself in our minds today, neither Hegel nor Marx can be our mentors. Mankind is becoming conscious of itself, of the terms of its planetary existence, of its regional experiments in civilisation conducted over many thousands of years. Mankind is larger than West European Man. When full credit has been allowed for Western values, the credit fund of significant human experience is still not closed. Today, the Chinese, the Indians, and the Arabs, in their overwhelming numbers, are entering once again into the arena of world history. The Slav peoples, oppressed for many centuries by Tartar and Teuton, and relatively isolated from the culture of both Asia and Europe, are demanding their place in the sun. And everywhere in the world, the masses are claiming their share of the human heritage.

Only in embryo is mankind as yet a world community. But all these various peoples, ancient and modern, backward and advanced, are beginning to establish economic, political, and ideological relations with each other. When these relations have matured, and have been stabilised in institutions, the world community will be the highest as well as the completest expression of what is significant in human values.

All the peoples of the world are on the march, with the world community as their final goal; but they are not marching in step, nor upon routes that have been mapped out. With the help of what "ideological music" can their pace be quickened and their spirits sustained? Can Marxism provide the ideological music? Are the peoples of the world bound to ask themselves whether their type of capitalism is sufficiently decayed and their self-conscious proletarianism sufficiently united to warrant them in believing that they are advancing from a capitalist to a communist society via the Dictatorship of the Proletariat?

Can the Chinese, for example, interpret the history of their own civilisation in Marxian terms? Can they apply to themselves the Marxian formula from Feudalism to Capitalism, and from Capital-

ism to Communism? Shin-Shi-Huang-Ti, the first Chinese Emperor, liquidated the Chinese Feudal System as early as 221 B.C. The absolutist empire which he founded lasted until the Revolution of 1912. It was governed by a professional civil service—the Mandarinate—chosen by public examination. The economic basis of the Empire, was, as always, the peasantry. Today, the so-called Communists of China are peasants conducting an agrarian revolution against the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Does the Marxian formula apply to Russia? Peter the Great, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, liquidated the old feudal class, replacing them by a service gentry. The service gentry functioned as a bourgeois class. Here again the economic basis was the peasantry. As late as 1861 the Russian peasants were still serfs. What brought the peasants in 1917 to the side of Lenin was his invitation to them to take forthwith the land of the service gentry. Here again we may question whether the Marxian formula provides the Russian with an interpretation of their own history.

Our doubts as to whether Marxism can provide an interpretation of world history increase when we turn to the Marxist view of "ideology". Morality and law, philosophy and religion are some of the components of "ideology"—but the most important of these is religion. The "ideology" is supposed to reflect the economic or politico-economic reality. No one doubts that the religion of Isis and Osiris, with its celebration of the death and resurrection of plant life, reflects the economic realities of Egyptian civilisation. And no one doubts that Medieval Catholicism reflects the feudal organisation of the Medieval World. But are these two "reflections" really comparable?

The Egyptian religion is the indigenous creation of the Egyptians: it fortified their faith in Egyptian civilisation and their will to preserve it. But is Roman Catholicism the indigenous creation of Romans and did it fortify their faith in Roman civilisation? What Christianity "reflects" is the civilisation of the Hebrews, who, when their polity foundered in Old Testament days, survived as a church under the High Priests of Jerusalem. And when Rome in turn foundered, what survived were the ideologies of two uprooted and bankrupt societies. Christianity, like Buddhism, is a religion of salvation. It requires its votaries to acknowledge the utter insufficiency of man-created societies, to look to God, the Creator, for the perfect Justice and the perfect Love, which, because they exist already and have always existed in the transcendent world, do not have to wait upon human creativeness.

The Marxists are certainly justified when they criticise vehemently the utopian character of Christian ethics. Absolute Justice and Perfect Love have no locus in the human world which is the world

of history, where men experiment in social relations, standardising their results in legal and moral institutions. To talk of Justice and Right in the abstract without specifying the historic society we have in mind is to condone the preventible injustice and unrighteousness of existing society on the defeatist plea that Man is as necessarily imperfect as God is perfect.

The Marxian formula, from Feudalism to Capitalism and from Capitalism to Communism, is attractive because it seems to enunciate a law of progress. But can the formula be applied to world history when the crucial fact of the pre-feudal period is the breakdown of the great civilisations? It is the breakdown of the historic societies of Israel and Athens and Rome which has induced Christianity to place Man's end outside history. Heaven has no place in the temporal and historic series. Marx, improving on Feuerbach, speaks as though the contradictions of Feudalism and Capitalism, which put upon the peasant and the proletariat most of the cost of civilisation, were the principal cause for the transference of Christian values from the politico-economic to the super-historical and transcendent plane.

We come back, then, to the central importance of a philosophy of world history. Mankind is on the march. All the extant civilisations of today—the Western, the Soviet, the Arab, the Indian and the Far Eastern—are in process of being taken up and integrated into the body of a new Global Civilisation. The One World which Wendell Wilkie and Franklin Roosevelt prophesied is in the making. How the One World will come into existence, at what cost in human suffering, and with what attendant losses in already accepted values, will depend very largely upon the interpretation that mankind puts upon its own historic advance from savagery to global civilisation. Only upon the foundation of a philosophy of world history can mankind create for itself a world religion.

To the humanist, religion is man's imaginative concern about himself. A man is religious when he has a vision of himself, of his society, and of his species against the cosmic background. Anthropomorphic gods have no place in the humanist's religion. The humanist sees himself as part of the stream of human history. He identifies himself imaginatively with Man—past and future man, as well as present. It is through this identification that there develops in him a sentiment for humanity which is akin to patriotism. And it is this sentiment which energises his will to civilisation—his will to share in the human adventure.

No one denies the desirability of world government conducted practically through world institutions. In Uno, such a framework of world government already exists. And no one denies that the piecemeal co-operation of the nations in specific economic acts—the

functional approach as it is called—will be propaganda for the One World. But piecemeal efforts, however successful, are not enough. There must simultaneously be propaganda for the Idea and the Sentiment of the One World. And here, again, an institution for the conduct of such propaganda exists in embryo: the institution is Unesco.

Unesco is not flourishing at present. The Catholics accuse it of being an organ of secularism. The Communists accuse it of sinning against the light of Marxism. The Chinese and the Hindus suspect that it favours Western as against World values. The truth is that Unesco cannot advance until it becomes clear and candid about its real purpose. And its real purpose is to make propaganda for Humanism as the world religion of the future.

But the Humanism for which Unesco is the missionary will be very different from an Ethicism peddling propositions about the Good, the Beautiful and the True in abstraction from the concrete historic life of Man upon his planet. The Humanism which aspires to be the Common Faith of Man is not an anaemic reduction of the transcendent entities of Christianity. It is not Christianity without Christ. But it is an historicist Humanism which starts from the accepted facts of human history and proceeds to interpret them in the light of a philosophy of civilisation. Historicist Humanism exploits to the full the new self-consciousness of Man about his origins, about the experiments in civilisation which he has been conducting for the last six thousand years, about the possibility which at long last opens before him of controlling his destiny as a planetary species.

With the new Humanism there will go a new morality. Justice will have a new meaning. For every civilisation has to be paid for. Without suffering and self-sacrifice no civilisation can endure. And Global civilisation, when it matures, will be no exception to this rule. The new Justice will aim at distributing evenly the cost of Global civilisation upon all the classes and peoples of the earth.

And with the new Humanism there will come a new interpretation of Human Love. "To everyone according to his needs, from everyone according to his abilities." In this principle, Communism and Humanism agree. Every child that is born into the world should feel that he is a child of the community, that the community wants him; and because it wants him, is prepared to endow him and his brothers equally with the necessary spiritual and material goods. And because every child has a right to be wanted and endowed, the world community—and only the world community—will have a right to call upon the peoples to control their sexuality. The Population Problem will become capable of solution only when global patriotism everywhere in the world is a strong enough sentiment to induce men to make some sacrifice of their sexuality for the sake of the world community.

We are on the eve of great events. We are experiencing a crisis of civilisation because Global Civilisation is in the throes of being born. We must therefore look upon ourselves as midwives to the new birth. We should endeavour to set up everywhere humanist "cells"—voluntary and unofficial Unesco organisations to make propaganda for the Common Faith of Mankind. JOHN KATZ

BOOK REVIEWS

THE STUDY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD. By Nicholas D. Cheronis, James B. Parsons, Conrad E. Ronneberg. Harrap, 21s.

This book of 48 chapters, covering nearly 900 pages, copiously illustrated and well indexed, was first published in 1946 and produced by three physicists of the Chicago City Colleges with the collaboration of colleagues, students and members of other institutions. The fact that an Instructor in Visual Aids gave valuable assistance may account for some of the exceptionally good illustrations.

The subjects mainly covered are geology, astronomy, mechanics, heat, light and sound, electricity and magnetism, and chemistry. The subjects treated have their historical setting and form a course in general science. At the end of each chapter is a summary, a study exercise, and a list of authorities to be consulted for further reading. Though in an early chapter the relation of mathematics to the sciences is discussed, little mathematics is required in order to understand the work. The style is lucid and there is no part of the book into which one can dip without finding it interesting and instructive.

The work is of particular importance to the more serious non-scientific reader who does not wish to go deeply into experimental laboratory work and yet wishes to obtain an insight into the nature, method and development of the physical sciences. The chapters on rock formation and erosion are readily readable by any person with no effort, as they are mainly descriptive, and many photographs and diagrams, principally American, illustrate excellently such concepts as stratification, conglomeration, soil erosion, cirques, moraines, eskers, synclines and anticlines. Similarly with regard to the chapters on geological history and those on the sun, moon and stars.

The more difficult chapters on subatomic energy and the periodic classification of the elements should not be beyond the grasp of the non-scientific reader. The treatment is simple. For instance, in Chapter 25, Rutherford's work in 1911 is described to show why the atom is now regarded as mostly made up of space. The zinc sulphide screen, the Wilson Cloud Chamber and the Guiger Counter are illustrated and described. The principle of the mass spectrograph of Aston, the detection of neutrons and the structures of the

hydrogen, deuterium and carbon atoms are illustrated and a photograph of cloud chamber tracks of alpha particles and of the positron accompany a clear exposition of the development from 19th century physics to the modern conception of the atom with its central nucleus of neutrons and protons and different energy levels of the circumambient electrons. Reference is also made to Professor Blackett's work on cosmic rays, and in later chapters to the uncertainty principle, the conversion of matter to energy. There is, however, no mention of the meson, of fission, the new elements or the uranium pile, since the work was doubtless written before the appearance of the Smythe Report. Neither is there any reference to radar or jet engines; but Lawrence's cyclotron is neatly summed up as a mechanical sling shot for deuterons. There is throughout the work much that the scientific reader also will find of interest and profit.

Considered as a text book for use in schools, a number of chapters would be intelligible to a third or fourth form boy in a Grammar School, especially those on geology and astronomy. And to an older boy many difficult concepts, such as those in mechanics and wave formation, are made intelligible with excellent illustrations having a special appeal to boys. For instance, the tug-of-war of the fat and thin boy on ice skates illustrating Newton's third law of motion and the principle of equal momenta; the fishing boy, sitting and walking, with his plumb line bobbing up and down, illustrating the Doppler effect; or the spinning boy with arms outstretched holding heavy weights suddenly lowering his arms, illustrating the moment of momentum. Most fifth form boys would also follow the principle of the lever and the laws of kinematic motion; the chapters on heat and heat engines, and those on the treatment of light, electricity and magnetism, and the excellent chapter on wave motion; also the relation of mathematics to science with its reference to the extension of human perception to distance in terms of light years, and at the other end to that below the electron microscope. But many a fifth form boy, and some sixth, would not find it easy to follow the excellent chapter on the combination of the atoms, and those that immediately follow; or that on Carbon—the Energy Carrier of Life. At least one copy of the book should be in every school library, and in the public libraries.

The authors and collaborators are indeed to be congratulated on achieving what they set out to do: the production of a first rate survey of their own field which will dovetail into an educational curriculum and also be of cultural value to John Citizen.

A. F. DAWN

MAN HIS OWN MASTER. By Archibald Robertson. The Thinker's Library. Watts, pp. 158, 2s. 6d.

In this work the author sets out to refute the critics of Humanism

who damn it by implication rather than by any studied analysis of its shortcomings in action and theory. Just because he does not suffer from their particular form of St. Vitus's Dance the humanist is held to lack something of value instead of a complaint. Robertson capably discusses his thesis that man is the architect of his own ideals and progress, in a manner that makes pleasant and easy reading.

In his judgment that the churches in general, and the Roman Catholic Church in particular, are the greatest menace to freethought, Robertson, however, appears unjustifiably to ignore the more potent threats of the secular political dogmas of communism and the various forms of nationalist dogma collectively known as fascism. It may be that in this and a few other countries on the same level of political development there is little danger from these political dogmas, but it is impossible to ignore the great challenge that has been made over the past twenty years to freedom of thought, and is still being made to-day, by political doctrines whose potency chiefly lies in claims to infallibility. The author gets over the difficulty by characterising Mussolini and Hitler as Christians, a contention upheld on the insufficient ground that Mussolini had a Concordat with the Catholic Church and that in both Italy and Germany the churches tolerated the fascist regimes. It is of course incontrovertible that the attitude of the churches to Mussolini and Hitler had no effect in determining their views and it is a travesty of truth to describe either of them as Christian.

It is in this implication that Hitler and Mussolini were Christians that the weakness of Robertson's own position is revealed. He has merely turned Christianity inside out. God is the devil and Christians are in the service of the Enemy of mankind. He is in fact the victim of his own early religious upbringing, and though he has changed the content of his eschatology there has been no change in the basic pattern of his thought. When writing on the Catholic Church, Robertson shows a heat of emotional feeling which at this time of day is a little extraordinary.

Some of those in the Humanist movement disregard the fact that one of the cardinal principles of the movement is freethought itself and not just antipathy to some particular dogma or collection of dogmas. Historically the struggle in this country has been against Christianity and the Christian churches, but the main battle has not been against the doctrines as such, but rather against the dogmatism and intolerance of their advocates. The main feature of the history of the past three centuries has been the change in the character of the thought in the Western countries. The dynamic of the attack on freethought comes not from religion to-day but from the secular state dogmas, and while not entirely ignoring the

threat from the theistic religions our main attention must be directed elsewhere. Of this, there is no recognition in this work. Recounting the iniquities of the Inquisition and other delinquencies of a body which fortunately will never again be in the position to wield arbitrary power on the scale which allowed of these things being done is not timely, especially when just such things are being perpetrated to-day by totalitarian states imposing secular dogmas.

M. L. BURNET

PORCUPINE PAMPHLETS. 1. Oscar Wilde: The Soul of Man Under Socialism. 2. Leo Tolstoy: The Slavery of Our Times, Translated by Aylmer Maude. 3. P. B. Shelley: A Defence of Poetry and A Letter to Lord Ellenborough. The Porcupine Press Ltd., 2s. 6d. each.

This series of reprints of famous pamphlets begins with three attractively produced issues and a provisional list of twelve titles. Each of the pamphlets listed offers its own intrinsic interest, but the thread on which they are strung is the universal dream of liberty, equality, and fraternity as the sovereign truth of human association. In these days of doctrinaire and bureaucratic socialism, when new presbyter is beginning to look like old priest writ large, the series is a reminder of revolutionary idealism, of the human ends which may be overwhelmed by the prodigious scale and complex organisation of the means. The title of the first essay may stand for the text of the whole series.

Wilde's style alone, humiliating and provoking, must have inspired hatred in many of his readers: to go softly with exaggerated simplicity, as though talking to children, fingering a deadly load of paradox, irony, and malice, is to excite contempt highly seasoned with fear and resentment. It was an admirable instrument with which to enunciate offensive opinions and with which to express the audacious naivety of his own genuine ideals. Undoubtedly "the new Individualism" ("the new Hellenism") which he asserts is an indestructible truth. The perfection of each person is his own work, his own secret. The difficulty is to get the individual interested in that work, apprised of that secret.

Tolstoy's essay is probably less well known, although, written at the end of his life, it is a complete and argued statement of his social philosophy. He makes, in general terms, the Marxist analysis of society, but draws different conclusions. He does not want the proletariat to rule, because if ruling is in question it must be to impose and maintain injustice by violence. Also the rule of the proletariat is not likely to help the proletariat: so long as the workers insist on adopting the tastes, needs, and claims of their masters, so long as they want the conveniences, comforts, and pleasures of

industrial civilisation, in order to gratify such appetites and wishes they must submit to slavery, to the stultifying conditions of factory life and work and to the direction of labour. Under socialism, they will submit to the rule of the new masters: that is all. The only way to be free is to abate or keep your wants to the simple, "natural" human level of immediate production and exchange, a form of human good immediately enjoyed and immediately protected by custom and opinion, without the need of government. It is not good enough to have government in the interests of the proletariat (which is slavery to artificial appetites), nor government based on acceptance (which may be rooted in inertia and stupidity); it is necessary to have society based on the permanent and recognised interests and truths of human living. Justice cannot be enforced, and where there is anything to be enforced it is unjust.

Tolstoy argues that force cannot be used on behalf of justice, Shelley, in the open letter to Lord Ellenborough, that it cannot be used to uphold truth or destroy error. The arguments are not of equal validity, for justice is a question of wills, and truth is not. Tolstoy's argument derives from his own fanatic dogmatism.

A Defence of Poetry although high-flown is worth re-reading. It is the work of a comprehensive and commanding spirit. Often what seems an extravagance turns out on examination to be a philosophic insight expressed with exactitude. One might wonder what it is that gives an essay in literary criticism a place in such a series as this. Of course Shelley himself is in mid-stream of the tradition of thought here revived. But there is fuller justification for reprinting this particular piece. All these preachers, artists, idealists—a Tolstoy, Thoreau, or Gandhi, a Morris, Kropotkin, or Mumford, a Ruskin, Whitman, or Read—can't stand the world (it is no wonder). On the other hand, they respond to aspects, possibilities, conceptions of the world with vivid sensibility and passionate enthusiasm. This tension of positive and negative is the dynamic of their social philosophies: they cannot accept the world and they cannot reject it, on any of the conditions which are humanly possible, present or to come. But they are not a mere nuisance. There is more in man than can be catered for every day, and by professional politicians. Shelley comes nearest to understanding this, with philosophic comprehension of the social function of the idealising mind. When he concludes his essay by saying, "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world," this is not the empty exaltation of human vanity: he has given his evidence and explained his meaning.

We can be thankful for this revival of the idealism of the revolutionary and pre-revolutionary ages, trebly thankful if it serves at all to arouse the idealism of a post-revolutionary age.

H. J. B.

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